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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to present results from the 
evaluation of a neural control scheme implemented within 
the NASA IFCS F-15 project. In particular, the neural 
network controller is based on an adaptive predictor-
corrector control strategy. The study is conducted within 
the WVU IFCS F-15 simulation environment, which 
enables to evaluate a wide range of failure scenarios. 
Analysis of the controller performance is performed in 
situations where the state variables vary within a wide 
portion of the flight envelope and in different failure 
conditions. Post failure performance evaluation concerns 
maneuvers accomplished both with the pilot-in-the-loop 
and with pre-recorded reference signals. Failure test-cases 
are grouped in three categories: actuator lockage at an 
imposed deflection, actuator lockage at the current 
deflection, missing of a control surface portion. Results 
demonstrate the capability of the neural controller in 
dealing with slight and hazardous damages.  
 
1. Introduction 
 The main objective of the Intelligent Flight Control 
System (IFCS) F-15 program[1] is to develop and evaluate 
through flight tests innovative flight control schemes, 
allowing the pilot to recover from primary control surface 
failures, which are major threats to flight safety. 
 The control scheme described in this paper is one of 
the 3 methods proposed by the West Virginia University 
(WVU) team within the Gen 2 NASA IFCS project (Figure 
1). The common feature of the 3 WVU schemes is that 
they are all based on neural algorithms, however neural 
networks (NN) are used in different ways. The first 
approach is based on the Non Linear Dynamic Inversion 
(NLDI) technique[2],[3] augmented with a pre-trained neural 
network (PTNN), providing the values of the aerodynamic 
and stability derivatives within the whole flight envelope. 
The second approach features a robust controller based on 
the Stochastic Optimal Feedforward and Feedback 
Technique[1] (SOFFT), which belongs to the class of State 
Feedback Linear Quadratic Optimal Control approaches. 
In addition, the SOFFT controller is augmented with a 
neural network to compensate errors due to system 
uncertainties and/or failures on primary control surfaces. 
 The third approach, outlined in this paper, takes 
advantage of the NN capabilities in performing system 
identification. In particular, the control activity is handled 
by two adaptive neural entities which identify the forward 
and the inverse F15 model and are connected according to 
the predictor-corrector scheme[4]. The identification of the 
forward dynamics of the plant is accomplished to estimate 
on-line the plant Jacobian, which is used in the inverse 
model adaptation process to implement the back 
propagation through the model. 
 In previous efforts this control architecture has been 
successfully adopted by the first two authors to implement 
a fault-tolerant Multi-Input-Multi-Output (MIMO) neural 
adaptive rate damping autopilot for a nonlinear H-106 
helicopter model[5]. In this study the controller is used as a 
Control Augmentation System (CAS), with the reference 
model tracking task, within the WVU IFCS F-15 
simulation environment. Differently from the previous 
application, the number of control channels (lat, lon, dir) 
are less than the number of the commanded surfaces 
(collective and differential stabilators, differential ailerons, 
differential canards, collective rudders). This implies that a 
command distribution action must be accomplished within 
the control strategy. 
 
2 Control Strategy 
As shown in Figure 2 desired handling qualities are set 
through a reference model. Flight commands are generated 
by the pilot through longitudinal and lateral stick (
sticklonδ , 
sticklatδ ) and pedals ( pedaldirδ ). These displacement 
commands are converted[3],[6]-[8] into roll rate, aerodynamic 
normal and lateral acceleration commands ( cmdp , zcmdn , 
ycmd
n ) through stick and pedal gains (Klat, Klon, Kdir). 
Afterwards these commands are transformed into 
corresponding roll, pitch, and yaw rate commands: 
=com cmdp p          
com zcmd
t
gq n
V
=          ( 1) 
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 The reference model provides filtered angular rate 
(pref, qref, rref) and angular acceleration commands ( ? refp , 
?refq , ?refr ). For this purpose, first order roll rate and 
second order pitch and yaw rate transfer functions have 
been used. The reference signals are processed by the 
neural controller, which calculates the required control 
signals. Before feeding the actuators, the  control signals 
are reallocated as follows: the pitch control channel signal 
moves the collective stabilators, the roll channel acts on 
the differential ailerons and on the differential stabilators, 
 the yaw control channel commands the collective rudder 
and the differential canards. Collective canard deflections 
are scheduled as a function of the Mach number and the 
angle-of-attack. 
 The control scheme is based on the reference model 
direct inverse scheme (also known as predictor-corrector). 
As shown in Figure 2, the plant emulator represents the 
forward model while the controller action is carried out by 
the inverse model. The forward and the inverse models 
have both three input variables and three outputs as they 
identify the direct dynamic response of angular rates (p, q, 
r) to command inputs (δlat, δlon, δdir) and viceversa. The 
forward model consists of three Multi-Input-Single-Output 
(MISO) networks connected in a parallel structure, 
whereas the inverse model features a SISO network for the 
longitudinal channel (q) and two MISO networks for the 
lateral and directional channels (p, r). This architecture has 
been selected as a result of a tradeoff between the 
requirement of suppling exhaustive information to each 
network and the necessity of minimizing the dimensions of 
the input/output relationships to the neural schemes. Each 
NN is Multi Layer Perceptron (MLP) with a single hidden 
layer which implements the identification of NARX 
(Neural Auto Regressive with eXternal inputs) systems 
according to the following scheme: 
)(f
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with the regressor vector φ shown in table 1, where the 
blocks outlined by the dashed lines are repeated in 
sequence depending on the number of the system inputs. 
 
Table 1 Regressor vector structure. 
φfwr φinv 
y1 ref (k+1) y(k) 
?  ?  
y1 (k-n) y(k-n) 
u (k-1) u1 (k-1) 
?  ?  
u (k-n) u1 (k-n) 
 
 Unlike previous implementations of the predictor-
corrector scheme, the inverse model has no direct 
feedback, meaning that the NN input vector is independent 
from the calculated output. Actually the input signals u(k-
1), u(k-2), …, u(k-n+1) (with n = network order) are 
provided by a linear inverse model, which feeds the neural 
system with an estimation of the plant input at the previous 
time steps (δlat, δlon, δdir)lin according to the following 
equation: 
1
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where B is the state space system control matrix defined 
as: 
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Precisely: 
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where the aerodynamic and control derivatives are relative 
to trim conditions and are kept constant even in non 
nominal conditions. 
 The terms (L1, M1, N1) are the actual plant acceleration 
contributions, which are functions of the inertial and 
geometric aircraft characteristics as well as the actual 
angular rates and aerodynamic angles:  
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 The neural inverse model is fed by the linear inverse 
model and filters the signals compensating for 
nonlinearities, modeling errors, model uncertainties and 
the dynamic modifications due to failures and non-nominal 
flight conditions. The results will show how the neural 
network activity increases as a consequence of some of the 
events mentioned above. 
 Avoiding the direct feedback of the NN output 
decreases the risk of oscillations during transient phases 
 and allows greater time steps, which, in turn, reduces the 
simulation time. 
 
2.1. Neural Network Training Algorithm 
 The forward and the inverse models are pre-trained 
using the back-propagation technique featuring the 
Levenberg-Marquardt method13. 
 To make the controller adaptive and fault tolerant, the 
forward and the inverse model must be trained on-line. 
The error functions which are minimized for the forward 
and the inverse model on-line training are respectively: 
  ( ) ( )12 ˆ ˆmTm p= − −E y y K y y    ( 13) 
  ( ) ( )12 cTc ref p ref= − −E y y K y y   ( 14) 
 The on-line training algorithm belongs to the 
Recursive Identification methods category and is basically 
an extension of the Recursive Pseudolinear Regression 
(RPLR) algorithm14. This technique is based on the step by 
step updating of the Θfw and  Θin vectors, which group in 
vector shape respectively the couples of matrices W1fw, 
W2fw  and W1in, W2in. 
 Omitting subscripts for simplicity, the equations 
below represent the kth time step of the RPLR algorithm: 
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applied according to the constant-trace technique. The Ψ 
matrix determines the gradient descent direction; for the 
forward model it is simply: 
( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆm fw m fwm mfw y mk k k=−∇ =∇e yΘ ΘΨ   ( 16) 
with m = 1,...,3, while for the inverse model it is: 
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with m = 1,...,3 and where the generic (j,i) element can be 
written as follows: 
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3. Aircraft Model and Simulation Environment 
 WVU researchers developed a simulation 
environment[11] based on a nonlinear approximate model of 
the F-15 aircraft. This model is derived from a Fortran 
code of a high performance military aircraft distributed by 
NASA to academic institutions within the 1990 AIAA 
GNC Design Challenge[12]. The aerodynamic and thrust 
characteristics are provided through 42 look-up tables, that 
is 16 tables for the longitudinal dynamics as functions of 
Mach number, angle of attack and stabilator deflections; 
20 tables for the latero-directional dynamics as functions 
of Mach number, angle of attack, sideslip angle and 
rudder; 2 tables for engine thrust and fuel flow as functions 
of Mach number and altitude. Additional look-up tables 
have been added for the modeling of the canard surfaces 
on the IFCS F-15 aircraft. 
 The simulation package is based on the Flight 
Dynamics and Control (FDC) toolbox[13] which is a 
graphical software environment within Matlab/Simulink. 
For graphic display and pilot interaction the dynamic 
model is interfaced with the Aviator Visual Design 
Simulator (AVDS) simulation package[14]. Particularly, the 
aircraft dynamic model is flown through a joystick device; 
however, pre-loading of command histories is also 
possible. In the open loop mode, the inputs given through 
the joystick are supplied directly to the   stabilators, 
ailerons and rudders actuators, while the collective canard 
deflection is scheduled as a function of the Mach number 
and the angle-of-attack. 
 
4 Failure modeling  
 A failure modeling stategy has been developed and 
applied for longitudinal, lateral and directional control 
surface blockage and partial destruction[15],[16]. The method 
is based on the assumption that when a control device 
failure occurs, an alteration of the aerodynamic forces and 
moments results which is equivalent to a net loss of 
“aerodynamic efficiency”. The contribution of each 
individual control device to the total external forces and 
moments is isolated and expressed in terms of a single 
parameter which can be varied during the simulation. 
 
4.1 Actuator blockage 
 A ‘control surface blockage’ implies that, after the 
failure occurrence at time tf1, the deflection of the control 
surface is no longer controllable since it either remains 
fixed at the value corresponding to tf1 or at a value reached 
shortly after tf1 (which is not a commanded position but a 
result of the failure). This behavior mainly characterizes a 
failure of the actuator or an actuator related mechanisms. 
A failure involving a blockage of the control surface at a 
fixed deflection value does not alter the aerodynamic 
properties of the control surface. 
 
4.2. Missing surface 
 Of different nature is the ‘destruction type failure’, 
which means that the “aerodynamic efficiency” of the 
control surface is deteriorated starting at the failure 
occurring moment tf2. A surface damage parameter sd 
describes the importance of the failure by means of the 
ratio between the efficiency parameter after and before the 
failure occurring moment. 
 ( ) ( )( )
k
k
k
u AfterFailure
d u
u BeforeFailure
E
s
E
=      (19) 
Therefore: sd ∈[0,1], with sd=1 for no failure and sd=0 for 
completely missing control surface. 
 
 5 Results  
The performance of the neural controller has been 
evaluated through different sets of maneuvers.  
The first set of maneuver is accomplished with 
prerecorded time histories of 56 seconds. The control 
action concerns short aileron, stabilator and rudder 
doublets and are devided into two successive sequences, 
from 0 to 24 sec and from 32 and 56 sec (Figure 3). Failure 
is scheduled at 24 sec, but the absence of the pilot-in-the-
loop makes the failure a quasi-random event. In this 
second set of maneuver 8 different failures are considered, 
to evaluate the effects of partial missing control surfaces 
(Man. from #2 and #5) and locked surfaces at the current 
deflection (Man. from #6 and #9). Failures concern in 
turns the 4 surfaces: stabilators, ailerons, rudders and 
canards, as shown in Table 2 and  
Table 3. Comparison is made with the first 24 seconds 
of each maneuver (Man. # 1), which reflect the controller 
behaviour in nominal condition. The NN activity, reported 
in  
Table 3 and Figure 4, is the difference between the 
command signals (δlat, δlon, δdir) calculated by the linear 
inverse model and those actually obtained by the neural 
inverse model. The NN activity is obviously supposed to 
increase when the aircraft is subjected to a failure event. 
Actually Figure 4 shows how the NN respond to 
compensate the aircraft deficiency, consistently with the 
kind of failure that occurs: the partial missing stabilator 
requests an increasing of the deflection mean value while 
the lockage implies wider deflection of the remaining 
effectors. Figure 5 shows the relative error for the three 
channels, roll, pitch and yaw, calculated as a percetage of 
the maximum value of the reference signal for Man. #4 
and Man. #8. The tracking errors increase in post-failuire 
conditions but remain bounded in a very narrow range. 
The second set of maneuvers concerns failures with 
the actuators locked at an imposed deflection, which is one 
of the most demanding failure event. Each maneuver, of 
200 seconds, is carried out with the pilot-in-the-loop and 
consists of three phases where the state variables vary 
within a wide portion of the flight envelope: 
- starting from a steady level flight at 6000 m and Mach = 
0.75, three short doublets have been accomplished 
respectively with ailerons, stabilators and rudder;  
- after 45 seconds there is a descent to 1000 m and Mach = 
0.5 within 80 s; 
- after the trim into the new flight condition, a set of 
doublets on the primary control surfaces has been 
performed in the same way as described above. 
Referring to Table 4, Table 5 and Figure 6, Man. #10 is 
peformed in non failure condition. Man. #11 features a left 
stabilator lockage at -5 deg in tf1 = 30 sec. (before the first 
rudder doublet, as shown in Figure 7). Man. #12 refers to a 
right canard lockage at -5 deg in tf1 = 30 sec. Thus, this set 
of maneuvers shows up the combined effects of the failure 
and of the operative condition change (in terms of altitude 
and ground speed). shows that the tracking action is 
performed with very low errors for roll and pitch channels, 
while the yaw channel has always less desiderable 
peformace, due to the strong coupling between p and r. For 
Man. #11 and # 12 the tracking errors slightly increase, in 
particular for the pitch channel as far as Man. # 11 is 
concerned and for the yaw channel in Man. # 12, as 
failures affect the aerodynamic surfaces that contribute, 
respectively, to the pitch and roll angular rate. 
Table 5 the integral of the control activity (ICA) for all the 
surfaces in terms of collective and differential stabilators, 
collective e differential ailerons, rudders, collective and 
differential canards. Obviously the control activity increase 
for all the three channels, apart from the surface directly 
aftected by the failure. This is due to the asymmetry of the 
failure which may introduce dynamic coupling effects and 
alteration of both force and moment setting up. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Performance analysis of the Predictor-Corrector neural 
controllor has been carried out in post-failure conditions. 
Different failure scenarios have been simulated according 
to an incresing level of workload for the NN controller: 
locked surface at the current deflection, missing surface 
and locked surface at an imposed deflection. Failures 
affect all the aerodynamic surfaces: stabilators, ailerons, 
rudder and canards. The neural controller has been tested 
both with simulations featuring the pilot-in-the-loop and 
with pre-recorded maneuvers. In all these situations, 
results demonstrate the capability of the neural controller 
of accomodating slight or hazardous damages with a very 
short transient. 
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Figure 1 General Block Diagram of the IFCS F-15 Gen-2 
Program 
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Figure 2 Predictor-Corrector scheme 
 
Figure 3 Reference signal for the first set of maneuvers 
  
Figure 4 NN activity for Man. #2 and Man. #6 
  
Figure 5 Relative errors for Man. #4 and Man. #8 
  
Figure 6 Man #10 (no failure) 
 
Figure 7 Man #11 (left stabilator lockage at -5 deg in tf1 = 
30 sec) 
Table 2 Tracking error for the first set of maneuvers 
Mean error [rad/sec] Std error [rad/sec] Max error [rad/sec] Tracking error roll pitch yaw roll pitch yaw roll pitch yaw 
Man. #1 - No failure -7.05E-05 -1.05E-03 1.02E-03 1.77E-03 7.66E-04 2.06E-03 5.44E-03 2.95E-03 7.84E-03
Man. #2 - left stab. -1.69E-04 -1.80E-03 -8.34E-04 3.61E-03 2.57E-03 2.65E-03 1.07E-02 7.73E-03 9.96E-03
Man. #3 - right can. -3.01E-04 -3.92E-03 7.51E-03 3.49E-03 2.21E-03 2.90E-03 9.05E-03 6.87E-03 1.54E-02
Man. #4 - right ail. 1.38E-03 -3.07E-03 7.59E-04 1.21E-02 6.20E-03 6.05E-03 3.48E-02 1.38E-02 1.78E-02
 
Man. #5 - left rud.  -2.13E-04 -2.93E-03 6.87E-03 8.49E-03 3.63E-03 5.39E-03 2.53E-02 1.15E-02 1.90E-02
Man. #6 - left stab. -7.12E-05 -7.88E-04 3.97E-04 2.41E-03 5.38E-04 4.35E-03 7.93E-03 2.48E-03 1.21E-02
Man. #7 - right can. -4.06E-05 -3.15E-04 -2.13E-04 2.89E-03 5.76E-04 5.81E-03 9.66E-03 1.92E-03 1.66E-02
Man. #8 - right ail. 1.22E-05 -3.29E-04 -4.50E-04 3.33E-03 6.27E-04 6.61E-03 9.29E-03 2.07E-03 1.65E-02
 
Man. #9 - left rud. 1.24E-05 -7.21E-04 1.72E-04 2.80E-03 5.67E-04 4.74E-03 7.74E-03 2.51E-03 1.15E-02
 
Table 3 NN activity for the first set of maneuvers 
Mean value [rad] Std value [rad] Max value [rad] NN activity ∆δs ∆δa ∆δr ∆δs ∆δa ∆δr ∆δs ∆δa ∆δr 
Man. #1 - No failure -3.46E-04-9.21E-03 1.80E-03 2.87E-03 1.24E-02 2.81E-03 1.38E-02 4.56E-02 1.18E-02
Man. #2 - left stab. 4.43E-02 5.88E-03 -8.85E-03 1.28E-02 1.69E-02 5.05E-03 7.73E-02 5.86E-02 2.40E-02
Man. #3 - right can. -1.56E-02-4.52E-02 8.77E-03 6.02E-03 1.98E-02 5.29E-03 3.04E-02 9.41E-02 2.70E-02
Man. #4 - right ail. 1.55E-02 4.77E-03 -5.15E-03 3.79E-02 3.93E-02 1.62E-02 8.81E-02 9.29E-02 4.60E-02
 
Man. #5 - left rud.  -1.49E-02-3.95E-02 1.16E-02 2.00E-02 5.14E-02 8.53E-03 5.79E-02 1.65E-01 3.89E-02
Man. #6 - left stab. 1.03E-04 -6.31E-03 1.57E-03 2.78E-03 2.25E-02 2.35E-03 1.26E-02 5.95E-02 1.09E-02
Man. #7 - right can. 1.92E-04 -3.18E-03 1.49E-03 2.76E-03 2.99E-02 2.17E-03 1.25E-02 7.89E-02 1.07E-02
Man. #8 - right ail. 2.61E-04 -3.23E-03 5.94E-03 2.89E-03 1.83E-02 8.66E-03 1.29E-02 5.12E-02 4.24E-02
 
Man. #9 - left rud. 1.51E-04 -5.50E-03 4.46E-03 2.89E-03 1.48E-02 6.36E-03 1.30E-02 5.14E-02 3.08E-02
 
Table 4 Tracking error for the second set of maneuvers 
Mean error [rad/sec] Std error [rad/sec] Max error [rad/sec] Tracking error roll pitch yaw roll pitch yaw roll pitch yaw 
Man. #10 - No failure -6.15E-05 -1.73E-04 1.14E-03 1.02E-02 2.14E-03 2.33E-03 6.76E-02 1.48E-02 1.14E-02
Man. #11 - left stab. 2.30E-03 7.27E-03 -6.96E-03 3.78E-02 1.40E-02 1.52E-02 1.98E-01 1.06E-01 1.25E-01
Man. #12 - right can. 9.02E-05 -9.48E-03 1.36E-02 1.24E-02 7.07E-03 1.08E-02 7.37E-02 2.47E-02 5.83E-02
 
Table 5 Control activity for the second set of maneuvers 
stabilators [rad/sec] ailerons [rad/sec] rudder [rad/sec] canards [rad/sec] Integral Control 
Activity (ICA) collective differential collective differential collective collective differential
Man. #10 - No failure 3.91E+00 3.30E+00 0.00E+00 6.61E+00 3.48E+00 6.05E+00 2.66E+00 
Man. #11 - left stab. 4.26E+00 2.86E+01 0.00E+00 3.50E+01 2.19E+01 6.88E+00 2.29E+01 
Man. #12 - right can. 1.12E+01 1.31E+01 0.00E+00 2.61E+01 2.45E+01 1.83E+01 9.55E+00 
 
m
is
si
ng
 
su
rf
ac
e 
lo
ck
ed
 
su
rf
ac
e 
 
lo
ck
ed
 
su
rf
ac
e 
 
m
is
si
ng
 
su
rf
ac
e 
